Hi! Welcome to my website. I am a Ph.D. Economics graduate from the University of Warwick. I am an applied economic theorist with a primary interest in information economics. I study issues in organizational economics and political economy.

I will be joining the Department of Economics at Ashoka University as an Assistant Professor from Fall 2020

Check out my detailed CV here




THE NEWSROOM DILEMMA with Federico Trombetta (Job Market Paper 1)

Conventional wisdom suggests that competition in the modern digital environment is pushing media outlets towards the early release of less accurate information. We show that this is not necessarily the case. We argue that two opposing forces determine the resolution of the speed-accuracy tradeoff: preemption and reputation. More competitive environments may be more conducive to reputation building. Therefore, it is possible to have better reporting in a more (Internet-driven) competitive world. However, we show that the audience may be worse-off due to another consequence of the Internet -- outlets' better initial information. Finally, we show how a source may exploit the speed-accuracy tradeoff to get "unverified facts" out to the audience quickly. 

FEEDBACK ON IDEAS with Zeinab Aboutalebi (Job Market Paper 2)

Employees are often assigned tasks comprising two distinct phases: In the first phase, ideas are generated; in the second phase, the best idea is implemented. Furthermore, it is common for supervisors to give feedback to their employees in this process. This paper studies the supervisor’s problem. Supervisors face the following tradeoff: while honest feedback encourages employees to discard bad ideas, it can also be demotivating. We obtain three main results. First, the supervisor only gives honest feedback to high self-opinion agents. Second, receiving honest feedback leads to high self-opinion agents exerting more effort. Third, overconfidence is potentially welfare improving.


We look for the optimal delegation mechanism that provides an agent with time-off from his current task to pursue his creative endeavors. Driven by high intrinsic motivation, the agent would like to get time off to pursue any idea he discovers. The principal, on the other hand, would like to offer the agent the time off only if she believes he has come up with an idea that has a high potential to succeed. We show that in the optimal mechanism the principal is inefficiently harsh on an agent who was initially provided the time off but lenient to the one who wasn't given the time off. This implies that an agent with a high potential idea might get only a limited chance to achieve the breakthrough. Creativity, therefore, only receives a limited opportunity.



We consider how a profit-maximizing intermediary designs, prices, and discloses tests to facilitate signaling between a sender and a receiver. Designing more difficult tests increases the willingness-to-pay of the more able senders, but reduces that of the less able senders.  We show that the intermediary is not indifferent between different tests with the same informativeness. Notably, the intermediary designs the easiest test possible to convince the receiver of the sender's ability. ``Splitting a single test into many'' helps the intermediary extract a higher surplus from better senders by inducing more participation of the bad senders. The reason is two-fold. First, making the test easier induces senders of all types to take the test more often to prove their mettle. Second, the decline in prices (due to more tests) is less than the increase in the number of tests.



Professor of Economics

The University of Warwick


Associate Professor of Economics

The University of Warwick



Professor of Economics

The University of Warwick




S0.57, Department of Economics

The University of Warwick

Gibbet Hill Road

Coventry CV4 7AL



Tel: +44 (0) 747 337 2277

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